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In March 1983, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research issued a ground-breaking
report entitled Securing Access to Health Care. 1 The report called for more
responsible health care decision-making not only in the private sector but at all
governmental levels, “to ensure that every American has a fair opportunity to
benefit from it.” 2
The extent to which the Constitution imposes a duty upon the government to
protect the health and safety of its citizens has been problematic. 3 The
conventional position subscribes to the belief that the Constitution is “negative”
or “defensive,” and that no positive obligation is imposed on the government to
act. 4 Consequently, according to this conventional position, the only protection
granted by the Constitution is to safeguard individual rights from abridgement
by the state. 5 Whereas, the countervailing position recognizes a historical
mandate for the states to affirmatively protect the citizenry. 6
In his State of the Union address on January 11, 1944, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt sought to fortify this minority interpretation of Constitutional
powers by enunciating what he termed a “[S]econd Bill of Rights.” 7 Among the
eight rights comprising this new Bill of Rights was a “right to adequate medical
care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good health.” 8 President
Roosevelt did not believe that this right could be found in, or derived from, the
1

PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND
BEHAV. RES., SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERVICES (1983) [hereinafter SECURING ACCESS
TO HEALTHCARE], available at http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past_commissions
/securing_access.pdf.
2. Id. at 1–2.
3. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 105 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 2d ed. 2010).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 9–10, 12–13(2004); IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF:
THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 195–96 (2013).
8. SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 13.
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Constitution; instead, he wanted this right—and the seven others—to be
recognized as “affirmative rights as fundamental commitments that a democratic
government should be making to its citizens.” 9 Although not enacted in its
totality as one Bill, various “superstatutes” began to be passed in the 1930’s as
part of the New Deal. 10 These “superstatutes” sought to codify Roosevelt’s
vision with the foremost among them being the Social Security Act of 1935. 11
Thirty years after the enactment of the Social Security Act of 1935, Congress
passed the Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, which established “a
hospital insurance program for the aged under the Social Security Act,” better
known as Medicare. 12 These amendments embodied President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s vision of “a Great Society,” where poverty and racial injustice would
be eliminated. 13 Forty-five years later, Congress enacted the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”), 14 which finally realized President
Roosevelt’s notion of a universal governmental commitment to provide
“adequate medical care” together with “an opportunity to achieve and enjoy
good health.” 15
Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely imposes a direct responsibility on the
government to protect individuals and populations, 16 after World War II, there
has been an increasing societal emphasis on recognizing society’s moral
obligation to ensure that health care benefits are made available to all on an
equitable basis. 17 However, the goal of “equality of opportunity” has been
thwarted. 18 Even though the United States has regulated health care for more

9. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 46 (2010).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 46–47; see also MORTON KELLER, AMERICA’S THREE REGIMES: A NEW POLITICAL
HISTORY 213 (2007) (explaining the greater societal impact of the Social Security Act of 1935).
12. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–97, 79 Stat. 286.
13. See JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 12–14 (1998)
(articulating the elements encompassing President Johnson’s “Great Society”).
14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(to be codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
15. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 7, at 12–13 (detailing President Roosevelt’s “[S]econd Bill of
Rights”). See generally Symposium, The Federal Leviathan: Is There Any Area of Modern Life to
Which Federal Government Power Does Not Extend?, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (2014).
16. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 3, at 106.
17. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, supra note 1, at 15; see Robert E. Moffitt, The
Economic and Ethical Dimensions of Health Policy, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 663,
664–65 (2002) (discussing the ramifications of the “World War II era tax policy,” which diminished
the ability for employees to make choices regarding health insurance).
18. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, supra note 1, at 15.
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than one hundred years, 19 “equity of access” has not yet been achieved 20 at both
the micro 21 and macro level of distribution. 22
At all three levels of governmental decision-making—local, state, and
federal—ethical principles are needed to serve as “practical guidance” to shape
policy and guide the distribution of health care responses. 23 One of the most
complicated and serious ethical problems of contemporary society is the need to
find a compromise or point of balance between the near insatiable demand for
health care and regulation and distribution of this scarce resource. 24
The major limitation to both setting and improving public health policy is that,
if people are healthier and live longer, this does not necessarily reduce
the lifetime expenditures on health care. Most of those expenditures
are incurred in the last six months of life, and no matter how long
people live, they will eventually enter that terminal phase. However,
the longer their healthier lives, the lower their average lifetime healthcare expenditures and the greater their productivity, as well as the
greater their utility since poor health reduces utility. 25
The foundational and, indeed, practical issue is, then, the extent to which
government funds should be provided to address specific types of health
concerns, as well as when actual care should be commenced and ceased. 26
Five standards of justice have been advanced over the course of time in order
to safeguard equitable access to health care and thereby come within the ambit
of a sustainable level of distributive justice in a just society. 27 These standards
are based on individual cases—with each standard having its own particular
19. Robert I. Field, Regulation, Reform and The Creation of Free Market Health Care, 32
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 301 (2011).
20. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, supra note 1, at 31.
21. See, e.g., MARK A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 15 (1993) (discussing the inequity of physician care within the United
States); Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y, Spring 1986, at 23, 23 (same).
22. See, e.g., GEORGE P. SMITH, II, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE NEW MEDICINE 17
(2008) [hereinafter DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE] (addressing the inequality of health care on a macro
level); Nan D. Hunter, Manager Process Due Care: Structures of Accountability in Health Care, 6
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS, Winter 2006, at 93, 97–98 (same). Interestingly, the extent
to which a legal claim can be asserted to protect the human right to health, health care, or health
protection is problematic. George P. Smith, II, Human Rights and Bioethics: Formulating a
Universal Right to Health, Health Care, or Health Protection?, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1295,
1313–14 (2005) [hereinafter Human Rights and Bioethics]; GEORGE P. SMITH, II, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND BIOMEDICINE 10–11 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of enforcing international human rights
claims in domestic courts).
23. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, supra note 1, at 3.
24. George P. Smith, II, Social Justice and Health Care Management: An Elusive Quest, 9
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2009).
25. GARY S. BECKER & RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCOMMON SENSE 138 (2009).
26. See id. at 77.
27. Smith, supra note 24, at 6.
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template for achievement. 28 It is far beyond the scope of this Article to probe
the philosophical subtleties of these five standards: distributive, general or
social, commutative, modulated, and retributive. Suffice it to observe, that
distributive justice is an ethical value or norm which studies the societal
obligation owed to all members of society in the micro allocation of its heath
care resources, while general or social justice seeks to shape and thereby chart
proper standards of use for individuals in advancing the common good. 29 The
level of responsibility in clinical medicine set between a physician and his
patient is termed commutative justice. 30 Modulated justice seeks to preserve
equity in distributive justice, general or social justice, and commutative justice. 31
Assuring compensation to those suffering injustice under commutative,
distributive, or general justice is the goal of retributive justice. 32
Central to the analysis of this Article is recognizing the complexity of reaching
a fair and equitable level of distributive justice in measuring health care
resources to be given or withheld. 33 The ineluctable conclusion to be drawn
from any analysis of the issue of the distribution of health care resources is that
the ever present quest for attainment of a social balance in policy making or a
balance in “the satisfaction of private and public needs,” 34 is
challenged—indubitably—by the “truce on inequality and the tendency
[towards] inflation.” 35 Indeed, the whole question of reaching this balance “is
lost” altogether as a consequence of this “debate over equality and social
equity.” 36
Strong cultural, political, and economic forces are always at play in shaping
public health policy and setting legal standards for normative conduct. 37 As has
always been the case in public health, new societal forces, political ideologies,
and economic conditions will have the ultimate effect of directing ever-changing
28. See id. at 6–9 (describing each standard in detail).
29. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, supra note 22, at 19; Smith, supra note 24, at 7; see also JOHN E.
ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996); William A. Galston, The Common Good:
Theoretical Content, Practical Utility, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Spring 2013, at 9, 9 (advancing
the notion that the common good “reflects the outcome for bargaining for mutual advantage subject
to a fairness test. And it is particularized through a community’s adherence to certain goods as
objects of joint endeavor.”).
30. Smith, supra note 24, at 7.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8 (explaining the role of administrative justice in society); see generally George P.
Smith, II, Distributive Justice and Health Care, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 421, 421–24
(2002) (same).
34. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 320 (1958).
35. Id. at 262.
36. Id. at 264; see also Human Rights and Bioethics, supra note 22, at 1319 (stating that the
balancing of “individual claims to health right protections . . . against societal or communal needs
. . . . means that equity is forsaken for economic stability.”) (footnote omitted).
37. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 514 (2d ed.
2008).
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laws and policies in the delivery of health care resources, and impact the elusive
balance between the collective good and the protection of recognized individual
rights. 38
Following President Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009, his bold agenda
for national development was lauded as the next logical step in America’s
advancement of a theory of social contract. 39 The critical components of the
President’s ideal of an American social contract were employment, energy,
retirement, and health care policies. 40 Indeed, the President was described as
the “American Rousseau.” 41 Economic equality was identified as the root of
any viable social contract because “economic inequality is central to a quest for
enacting a social contract.” 42
In 2010, President Obama signed into law America’s first universal health
care plan. 43 In October, 2012, the President himself opined that the PPACA \—
commonly referred to as Obamacare — would ultimately be seen as “the last
piece of our basic social contract.” 44 Whether this legislation is viewed as a
noble effort by the federal government to re-negotiate the terms of a
contemporary social contract with its citizens, or but another giant step in
widening a culture of dependency, rests—in very large measure—upon the
particular socio-political philosophy taken. 45
38. Id. at 513–14; Galston, supra note 29, at 11.
39. Brian Gilmore, American Rousseau: Barack Obama and the Social Contract,
35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 43 (2009).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id. at 23.
43. See infra Part I.A.
44. Martha T. Moore, Obama Calls ‘Other Guy’ an Expletive, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2012,
at 4A. Some say that the PPACA not only furthers the rights of people with disabilities, but actually
recognizes disabilities as a category of anti-discrimination through “provid[ing] a comprehensive
web of legal protections that both outlaw discrimination and promote access.” Jessica L. Roberts,
Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 2035 (2013). See also Colbert I.
King, Obamacare — A Question of Morality, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/colbert-king-obamacare-is-a-matter-of-morality/2013/11/29/90379818-57b4-11e38304-caf30787c0a9_story.html (concluding that indifference to the needs of others is immoral and
applauding Obamacare for responding to the needs of Americans who have no health insurance).
45. See Michael Grunwald, One Nation Subsidized: How Big Government Underwrites Your
Life, TIME, Sept. 17, 2012, at 30 (arguing that Republicans fear the rise of big government under
the Obama Administration); see also Marshall B. Kapp, Health Reform and the Affordable Care
Act: Not Really Trusting the Consumer, 42 STETSON L. REV. 9, 33 (2012) (criticizing the PPACA’s
approach to healthcare that disdains the individual consumer’s freedom to improve healthcare
quality, access, and affordability, but, instead, codifies the paternalistic notion that “wisdom derives
from central planning and intensive regulation” of healthcare resources thereby distorting the very
integrity of the social contract); Daniel Henninger, Let ObamaCare Collapse, WALL ST. J., Sept.
25,
2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023045262045790974
43230322758 (discussing the potential impact of the public’s growing dissatisfaction with
ObamaCare); Charles Krauthammer, Obama Unbound, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2013, at A19
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Regardless of the socio-political philosophy taken regarding the PPACA and
the dimensions of a social contract, there is little dispute over certain facts:
presently, there are at least 2,199 federal assistance programs. 46 There are
approximately 49.7 million Americans (or 16.3%) in poverty. 47 Approximately
15% of Americans use food stamps (now referred to as the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP). 48 Although most Americans pay
taxes—either through payroll taxes, gasoline taxes, sales taxes, and state and
local taxes—“only half the country pays income taxes.” 49 Allowable tax
deductions for health care expenses cost the U.S. Treasury $184 billion a year. 50
Further, in 2011, 65% of federal spending went towards actual “payment for
individuals”—which included health care. 51 This 2011 expenditure was a giant
leap from expenditure levels in 1955, when the federal government expended
only 21% of federal spending on “payments for individuals.” 52

(lamenting President Obama’s second term goal of pursuing a “vision of a more just social order
where fighting inequality and leveling social differences are the great task of government,” which
is achieved by preserving and enhancing entitlements). See generally Symposium, Implementing
Health Reform: Fairness, Accountability & Competition, 5 ST. LOUIS J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1
(2011) (presenting various issues federal and state governments will have to overcome during the
PPACA implementation process); Symposium, The New American Health Care System: Reform,
Reformation, or Missed Opportunity?, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577 (2011) (presenting various
perspectives on the new health care system); Symposium, supra note 15.
46. See CFDA Statistics: Programs at a Glance, CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC
ASSISTANCE, http://www.cfda.gov (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
47. Hope Yen, Millions More Americans in Poverty Than Previously Estimated: Census
Bureau, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2012, 7:07PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/11/14/american-poverty-2012_n_2130544.html.
48. Diana Furchtgott Roth, Food Stamps Expand By Leaps, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 18,
2012, 4:05PM), available at http:///washingtonexaminer.com/article/2508364. The Obama
administration recently widened the benefit eligibility under SNAP by exempting states from
following the 1996 welfare reform legislation that required participants to either undertake work or
prepare for employment. Robert Rector, How Obama is Gutting Welfare Law, WASH. POST, Sept.
7, 2012, at A27. In the District of Columbia, D.C. City Councilman David Catania observed that
in order to reform welfare, program participants must assume some level of responsibility to leave
the welfare program. Alan Blinder, D.C. Toughens Up Requirements for Welfare Recipients,
WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 8, 2013, 8:45 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/video
-d.c.-toughens-up-requirements-for-welfare-recipients/article/2517946 (discussing the D.C. City
Council’s attempt to create personal responsibility, by enacting legislation that punished welfare
beneficiaries for failing to complete “programs designed to help them improve their lives,” such as
job training programs, or suffer up to a 3 month benefit withholding; the proposed legislation was
ultimately modified to a 1 month benefit withholding).
49. Grunwald, supra note 45, at 32.
50. Id. at 35.
51. Robert J. Samuelson, It’s the Welfare State, Stupid, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2012, at A19.
52. Id.; see Nicholas Eberstadt, Are Entitlements Corrupting U.S.? Yes, American Character
is at Stake, WALL ST. J., Sep. 1, 2012, at C1 (discussing growing disillusionment with entitlements
and the mismanaged and expensive state of social programs); Robert J. Samuelson, The End of
Entitlement: Americans’ Lofty Expectations Get a Reality Check, WASH. POST, April 29, 2013, at
A15 (same).
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While there is little consensus on how to manage these grave socio-economic
issues, the American “political system is sclerotic if not dysfunctional.” 53 As
debt ceiling posturing began anew in January 2013, President Obama’s
administration maintained that the economy would be stimulated by more
government spending, which, in effect, would create new jobs and increase
productivity levels. 54 House Republicans, led by the Speaker of the House, John
Boehner, asserted that the government spending should be cut by the same
amount that the debt ceiling was to be raised. 55 House Republicans further
asserted that if the government failed to reform the so-called “entitlement”
programs, the Nation would be seen as adopting “a European-style welfare
state.” 56
For a considerable time, Americans have held to the opinion that “society is
falling apart” and that national goals are too broad and complex. 57 In terms of
health care management, Americans themselves are in large measure to “blame”
for the present state of affairs—simply because “they lack the information
critical to understanding the need for change.” 58
This Article will illustrate that President Obama’s approach to universal
health care is in stark contrast with the fundamental principles of Rousseau’s
theory of social contract. The purpose of the social contract is not economic
equality or an all-providing government state. 59 Rather, the social contract
envisioned by Rousseau, and adopted by the Framers of the American
Constitution, is a foundation upon which individuals can succeed. 60
Part I of this Article discusses the general principles of the social contract and
its influence on American democracy. Part II analyzes the current state of health
care in the United States using survey data and statistics, and then proceeds to
53. Eugene Robinson, A Monument to Our Nation at Its Best, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2012, at
A19; see Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, Finding the Common Good in an Era of
Dysfunctional Governance, J. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Spring 2013 at 15, 15 (concluding that
America is facing “a crisis of governability and legitimacy” and—if there are to be changes in
serving the common good—“an informed and strategically focused citizenry” must come forward
and become engaged). See generally Galston, supra note 29.
54. Editorial, For Obama, Deficits Don’t Matter Any More, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 13, 2013,
5:50PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/examiner-editorial-for-obama-deficits
-dont-matter-any-more/article/2518440#.
55. Id.
56. Id.; see Nicholas Eberstadt, Editorial, Yes, Mr. President, We Are a Nation of Takers,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2013, at A13 (pointing out that there is an increasing percentage of American
workers, “more than twice that of contemporary Greece,” that have withdrawn from the workforce).
57. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA 171, 186 (1994).
58. Bryan R. Lawrence, Tell Americans the Real Cost of Medicare, WASH. POST, May 31,
2012, at A15; see Mann & Ornstein, supra note 53, at 15.
59. See CHRISTOPHER BERTRAM, ROUSSEAU AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 203 (2004)
(describing the social contract as allowing a “mutual coexistence”).
60. See id.; see generally ALFRED COBBAN, ROUSSEAU AND THE MODERN STATE 113–50
(1964) (detailing the essential purpose of the Social Contract).
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discuss the moral hazard associated with a universal health care plan. Part III
proposes the appropriate role of the government in health care as shaped by the
social contract. In order to evaluate the government’s role within the present
context, Part V analyzes the regulatory framework mandated by Congress for
administering the new social contract for allocating health care resources. Part
IV investigates the Independent Payment Advisory Board’s (“IPAB”) function
and its broad grant of authority. Using current statistics and projections, the
economic feasibility of reducing Medicare expenditures — while maintaining a
high level quality of care and broad access to services — is explored as a
paradigm for achieving distributive justice. 61 Finally, Part V probes the IPAB’s
expected impact on Medicare, and concludes that the IPAB will ultimately,
herald a new age of decreased quality and indirect rationing of basic health care
services.
I. THE AMERICAN SOCIAL CONTRACT
The Social Contract is a philosophical approach to political order in which
individuals consent to a sovereign power that, in turn, derives its authority from
the consent and general will of the populace. 62 Rousseau proposed that without
civil order, individuals exist in the state of nature. 63 In the state of nature,
individuals are free to do as they wish, but they are exposed to the unbridled
greed of others. 64 In this state, the only limits are an individual’s own
capabilities. 65 Rousseau argued that in this basic state, “every force which
overcomes another force inherits the right which belonged to the vanquished.” 66
Strength begets obedience, but might does not make right. 67 Although
Rousseau’s notion of a state of nature was utopian, 68 it was also a valid means
of expressing “the development of the principle of the autonomy of the will, by
means of which [Rousseau] reconciled with liberty.” 69

61. The complications attendant to this aspirational effort for equitable distribution are
inextricable from the increasing costs of basic healthcare and of Medicare.
62. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 136 (Maurice Cranston trans. 1968).
There is no actual agreement in the “grand social contract”; rather, “it is meant to produce the same
win/win outcomes, just like ordinary contracts, and to do so in settings where huge members of
individuals are forced to participate in this joint social venture.” RICHARD D. EPSTEIN, THE
CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 20
(2014). Those who deviate, unilaterally, from the contract are seen as menaces or alternatively as
freeloaders. Id.
63. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 59–60.
64. See id. at 65.
65. See id. at 52–53.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id.
68. CHRISTOPHER D. WRAIGHT, ROUSSEAU’S THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A READER’S GUIDE
14 (2008).
69. COBBAN, supra note 60, at 42–43.
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In an effort to protect personal property and create a code of civil liberties,
humanity forsakes the state of nature. Rousseau argued that humanity reaches
“a point where the obstacles to their preservation in a state of nature prove
greater than the strength that each man has to preserve himself in that state.” 70
Humanity exits the state of nature by consenting to a sovereign authority that
offers protection and provides a foundation that allows man to prosper. 71
Individuals lose the ability to take by force, but gain “civil liberty and the right
of property.” 72 Thus, according to Rousseau, the goal of the civil society is the
protection and preservation of its members. 73
Rousseau believed that “[t]he purpose of social contract is to preserve the
contracting parties.” 74 Accordingly, “[h]e who wills the end wills the means
also; and these means necessarily involve certain risks, and even contain
losses.” 75 “Fair terms of co-operation” are essential to the integrity of the
contract. 76 Unhappiness and moral degradation occur when unequal relations of
dependence result from the subversion of healthy drives “into a more grasping,
self-centered set of motives.” 77
The fundamental principles underlying the social contract serve as the
foundation for American democracy. Echoing Rousseau’s belief that man is
born free, the Declaration of Independence begins with the words “[w]e hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
The Framers wrote
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” 78
“[g]overnments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.” 79 The Declaration reflects a belief that the authority
of the government is derived from the consent of the governed—a central tenet
of Rousseau’s social contract. 80
70. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 59.
71. Id. at 59–60.
72. Id. at 64–65. Rousseau argued that from the social contract, man gains “civil liberty and
the legal right of property in what he possesses.” Id. at 65.
73. Id. at 59–60.
74. ROUSSEAU: POLITICAL WRITINGS 35 (Frederick Watkins trans., 1953).
75. Id.
76. BERTRAM, supra note 59, at 131–32.
77. WRAIGHT, supra note 68, at 17.
78. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
79. Id.
80. Gilmore, supra note 39, at 21–22. For an extensive analysis of the impact of social
contract theories on the foundation of American democracy, see GARY ROSEN, AMERICAN
COMPACT: JAMES MADISON AND THE PROBLEM OF FOUNDING (Wilson Carey McWilliams
& Lance Banning eds., 1999). Interestingly, Pope Benedict XVI’s first social Encyclical Letter,
Caritas in Veritate, signed June 29, 2009, addressed issues of global development and progress
toward advancing and preserving the common good by reflecting on how mortal principles shape
economic and social issues. Pope Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, VATICAN (June 29, 2009),
available
at
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben
-xvi_enc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate_en.html. Although the term, social contract, is not used
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A. The PPACA and the Social Contract
It has been argued that an “obvious component of any key social contract
between the state and the people” is the provision requiring universal health care
through a single-payer system. 81 Further, because “all western industrialized
nations in Europe provide universal healthcare,” the fact that a large portion of
the U.S. population is without health insurance underscores the failure of the
government to meet its responsibility. 82 However, the comparison to other
countries is irrelevant, because it is the consent of the governed that gives
legitimacy to laws—not the consent of those governed in other nations. 83
President Obama also believes that universal health care is a key component
of the social contract. In his book, The Audacity of Hope, Obama writes,
“[g]iven the amount of money we spend on health care (more per capita than
any other nation), we should be able to provide basic coverage to every single
American.” 84 In pursuit of this belief, the President and Congress enacted the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). 85 Signed into law on
March 23, 2010, the PPACA is an expansive piece of legislation intended to
create a universal health care system. 86 Among many new provisions, the Act
requires individuals to purchase health care or face a penalty. 87 This individual
mandate, and several other provisions, have been challenged in federal courts. 88
From March 26 to March 28, 2012, the Supreme Court heard six hours of oral
arguments. 89

specifically, there are direct allusions to this theory in Ch. 3 of the Encyclical where the idea that
charity (or giving) fosters justice and a sense of common good among economic actors is advanced.
See generally CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM: A THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY (Michael Novak, ed.,
1979).
81. Gilmore, supra note 39, at 25–26.
82. Id. at 25.
83. See id. at 21–22 (stating that governments derive their powers from the people).
84. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS OF RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN
DREAM 184 (2006).
85. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(to be codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
86. See id.
87. HINDA CHAIKIND ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41664, PPACA: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF THE LAW, IMPLEMENTATION, AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 2 (2011). See EPSTEIN,
supra note 62, at 185–93 (evaluating both conservative attacks on the PPACA and the liberal
responses).
88. Id. at 5. Attorneys general and governors from 26 states have challenged the individual
mandate. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577, 2580 (2012);
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 266–67 (4th Cir. 2011) (challenging the
individual mandate). See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism: Examining the
Interaction of Party Politics and Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1078 (2014).
89. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Cases, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PPAACA.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
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B. The Constitutional Challenge to the PPACA
On June 28, 2012, a divided five-to-four Supreme Court decided National
Federation of Independent Business et al. v. Sebelius—the first constitutional
challenge to the PPACA that has reached the Supreme Court. 90 Twenty-six
states, several individuals, and the National Federation of Independent Business
challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the PPACA—the individual
mandate that requires individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a tax, and
the provision that requires States to expand Medicaid eligibility or lose existing
federal funding. 91 The Court only addressed the constitutionality of the PPACA,
it did not “consider whether the Act embodies sound policies.” 92
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts first addressed whether the
Anti-Injunction Act precluded the lawsuit. 93 Under the Act, “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained
in any court by any person.” 94 Thus, if the individual mandate was construed as
a tax, plaintiffs would be barred from bringing the suit until the tax was actually
levied. 95 The Court held that the individual mandate was not intended to be a
tax, but rather as a penalty. 96 Therefore, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs
were not estopped from bringing suit under the Anti-Injunction Act. 97
The Court then addressed whether the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 98 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the ability to regulate existing commercial activities—however, the
individual mandate creates commercial activity. 99 Therefore, the Commerce

90. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2608. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, Chief Justice Robert’s
Marbury Moment: The Affordable Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335 (2013)
(commenting on Chief Justice Roberts’ interpretation of the case); Symposium, Health Care and
The Constitution: A Forum on The Supreme Court’s Affordable Care Act Decision, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1697 (2013) (discussing the consequences of the Sebelius decision).
91. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2577, 2584–86, 2601–04. The Court explained that the
Medicaid provision “requires state programs to provide Medicaid coverage to adults with incomes
up to 133% of the federal poverty level, whereas many States now cover adults with children only
if their income is considerably lower, and do not cover childless adults at all.” Id. at 2582.
92. Id. at 2577.
93. Id. at 2582–84.
94. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
95. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84.
96. Id. at 2584.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2586, 2593. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (stating that under the Commerce
Clause Congress shall have the power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. (dictating that Congress
shall have the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”) (emphasis added).
99. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2586–87.
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Clause does not grant Congress the authority to create commerce and then
regulate it. 100
Likewise, the Court held that the individual mandate cannot be sustained
under the Necessary and Proper Clause in the absence of another authority. 101
The Court concluded that although the Necessary and Proper Clause is exercised
appropriately in support of another constitutionally vested authority, through the
individual mandate, Congress created the necessity that it sought to justify. 102
Ultimately, the majority upheld the individual mandate as a legitimate exercise
of congressional power under the Taxing Clause. 103 While the PPACA
describes the tax as a penalty, the Court held that it is properly construed as a
tax, and thus within Congress’ authority. 104
The Court then turned to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provision, which
threatens to terminate current federal funds if States fail to comply with the new
terms. 105 This provision of the PPACA requires state Medicaid programs to
provide coverage to “all individuals under the age of 65 with incomes below
133% of the federal poverty line.” 106 Chief Justice Roberts noted that the
PPACA changed the nature of the Medicaid program from “a program to care
for the neediest among us” into “an element of a comprehensive national plan to
provide universal health insurance coverage.” 107 While the PPACA provided
federal funds to assist states with meeting the expanded eligibility criteria, states
that chose not to participate risked losing the federal Medicaid funds that they
already received under the existing framework. 108
The States argued that this provision violated the Spending Clause, which
provides Congress with the ability to “pay the Debts and provide for
the . . . general Welfare of the United States.” 109 While Congress can use this
power to develop federal and state spending programs, a State must have the
ability to voluntarily and knowingly accept the terms of such a program. 110
100. Id. at 2591; see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., ObamaCare and the Original Meaning of the
Commerce Clause: Identifying Historical Limits on Congress’s Powers, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1703,
1743–45 (explaining that the Commerce Clause regulates current commercial dealings, not those
that may occur in the future).
101. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
102. Id. at 2592. See generally Rebecca L. McCullough, What Is All the Fuss About?: The
United States Congress May Impose a Tax (It’s Called the “Individual Mandate”), 22 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 729 (2013).
103. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2601.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2606.
108. Id. at 2601, 2603–04.
109. Id. at 2601 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. 1).
110. Id. at 2601–02 (explaining that “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of the spending
power ‘thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms’”) (quoting
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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However, Congress exceeds this authority when it withholds other funding to
pressure the States to accept a Spending Clause program, because coercing the
States in this manner runs counter to this Nation’s “system of federalism.” 111
The Chief Justice compared the PPACA’s threat to cut noncompliant States’
existing funds to “a gun to the head.” 112 The majority concluded that the
Medicaid expansion provision was too coercive and robbed States of the
voluntary choice to participate in the program. 113 Thus, the portion of the
PPACA that required States to expand Medicaid eligibility or risk losing current
funding was held unconstitutional. 114
Regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sebelius, the question remains:
should universal health care be a major component of the American social
contract? Both the belief that universal health care is an integral component of
a contemporary theory of social contract, and the belief that the implementation
of the PPACA is necessary to a re-negotiated notion of this contract, inherently
contradict the underlying principles of Rousseau’s social contract. The purpose
of leaving the state of nature and forming a civil society was to relinquish man’s
“absolute right to anything that tempts him,” in exchange for civil liberties and
a legal right to property. 115 The widespread public opposition, 116 and the
realities and consequences of implementing universal health care in its current
form, reveal the gaping inadequacies of attempting to justify the law based on
the American social contract. 117
Prior to the Court’s decision, Charles Krauthammer opined that if the PPACA
was upheld as constitutional, it would be the catalyst for altering the very “nature
of the American social contract.” 118 Further, Krauthammer explained that the
direct consequence of the Supreme Court holding the PPACA constitutional
would “mean[] the effective end of a government of enumerated powers—i.e.,
finite, delineated powers beyond which the government may not go, beyond
which lies the free realm of the people and their voluntary institutions.” 119
Additionally, the central government would be one “of unlimited power from
which citizen and civil society struggle to carve out and maintain spheres of
autonomy.” 120

111. Id. at 2602.
112. Id. at 2604.
113. Id. at 2605.
114. Id. at 2666.
115. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 65.
116. See Healthcare System, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4708/healthcare
-system.aspx?version=print (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
117. See infra Part V.
118. Charles Krauthammer, Obamacare: The Reckoning, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2012, at A19.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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C. The PPACA and the General Will
Legitimate laws are those that accurately reflect the general will of the
populace, and are implemented by lawmakers that inform the polity. 121 Laws
that are not legitimate are not binding on society. 122 The general will rests on
the assumption that the populace is informed and expressing a desire for a
general good, rather than an amalgamation of individual desires. 123 According
to Rousseau, “[t]here is often a great difference between the will of all [what all
individuals want] and the general will; the general will studies only the common
interest while the will of all studies private interest, and is indeed no more than
the sum of individual desires.” 124 To ask only what government will provide at
the expense of others is inconsistent with the very purpose of forsaking the state
of nature—civil liberties and the protection of private property. 125 To allow the
majority to take from the minority is a reinstatement of “the strongest is always
right.” 126
The PPACA is supposed to be funded through a variety of measures including
decreased Medicare spending and fines levied on non-complying individuals
and institutions. 127 According to the Congressional Research Service, the
“PPACA appropriates and transfers from the Medicare trust funds billions of
dollars . . . to support many of [its] provisions.” 128 As implemented, the PPACA
embodies a reversion to the state of nature, rather than a legitimate law within
the social contract.
D. The PPACA and the Lawgiver
Wise leadership is necessary to accurately guide the general will and translate
the voice of the people into legislation. Rousseau posed the hypothetical
question: “How can a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wants,
because it seldom knows what is good for it, undertake by itself an enterprise as

121. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 81–83 (explaining that “laws stem from the general
will”).
122. See id. at 53.
123. Id. at 72–73, 83.
124. Id. at 72.
125. Id. at 64–65, 76; see also Eberstadt, supra note 56 (explaining that “[t]his ‘taker’ mentality
can only weaken civil society—even as it places ever-heavier burdens on taxpayers.”).
126. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 52–53.
127. CHAIKIND, supra note 87, at 4.
128. Id.; see Douglas Holtz-Eakin & Michael J. Ramlet, Health Care Reform is Likely to Widen
Federal Budget Deficits, Not Reduce Them, HEALTH AFFAIRS, June 2010, at 1136, 1137–38. See
also Philip Klein, By Discouraging Work, Obamacare is Making U.S. Fiscal Problems Worse,
WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:02 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/by
-discouraging-work-obamacare-is-making-u.s.-fiscal-problems-worse/article/2543622 (analyzing
a report from the Congressional Budget Office and concluding that these findings confirm the
opinion of conservatives that the implementation of Obamacare “discourages work and created
more government dependency”).
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vast and difficult as a system of legislation?”129 The lawgiver, Rousseau argued,
should help the polity find “the good path which it is seeking.” 130 The polity
must be “secured against seduction by the desires of individuals; it must be given
a sense of situation and season, so as to weigh immediate and tangible
advantages against distant and hidden evils.” 131 Thus, the lawgiver must help
inform the public of its decisions, and protect the integrity of the general will
from the desires of the individual.
It is incumbent upon the legislature to inform the general will and enact
legislation that accurately reflects the voice of the people. Congress failed to
inform the public of the danger implicit in the health care legislation and allowed
the desires of individuals to corrupt the general will. As enacted, the PPACA is
over nine hundred pages long. 132 In response to the new law, some estimate that
federal agencies have issued roughly 3,500 pages of PPACA related rules,
notices, and corrections. 133 During the 2010 Legislative Conference for the
National Association of Counties, then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
famously said, “we have to pass the bill so that you can find out what is in it.” 134
Polls reveal that Americans lack faith in the current leadership. 135 When given
several options and asked who they “trust the most to make sure that all
Americans have access to quality healthcare,” 46% of those surveyed “chose
‘none of these’ or ‘don’t know.’” 136
Finally, the gap between desired reform and the resulting legislation is wide.
In response to the question “[h]ow much do you personally worry about the
availability and affordability of healthcare,” 60% of those surveyed in March

129. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 83.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Tom Giffey, Is ‘Obamacare’ Really That Long?, LEADER-TELEGRAM (July 17, 2012,
2:01 PM), http://www.leadertelegram.com/blogs/tom_giffey/article_c9f1fa54-d041-11e1-9d01
-0019bb2963f4.html (reporting that the Affordable Care Act, as enacted by Congress, consisted of
906 pages (not between 2,400 and 2,700 pages) in its final version, which is less than the earlier
version of the bill consisting of 2,076 pages).
133. Allison Bell, PPACA: The Collateral Damage, LIFEHEALTHPRO (June 2, 2011),
http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/06/02/ppaca-the-collateral-damage.
See generally John
Harwood, The Next Big Challenge for Obama’s Health Care Law: Carrying It Out, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2013, at A14 (explaining the many challenges facing the implementation of the PPACA).
134. Marguerite Bowling, Video of the Week: “We Have to Pass the Bill So You Can Find Out
What is in It”, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Mar. 10, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://blog.heritage
.org/2010/03/10/video-of-the-week-we-have-to-pass-the-bill-so-you-can-find-out-what-is-in-it/.
135. See David Ingram, Poll: Idea of Healthcare Overhaul Gets Wide Support, REUTERS (Mar.
28, 2012, 6:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/28/us-usa-healthcare- poll
-idUSBRE82R1FA20120328 (finding, in a poll consisting of 1953 Americans, that a large
percentage of those polled trusted neither Republicans nor Democrats to provide “quality
healthcare”).
136. Id. The choices were: Obama (14%); Democrats in Congress (9%); Republicans in
Congress (7 %); pharmaceutical companies (1%); insurers (6%); and, doctors and other healthcare
practitioners (18%). Id.
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2012 responded that they worry a “great deal.” 137 However, when asked
whether Congress should make changes to the PPACA, a mere 13% replied
“keep [it] as is.” 138 By failing to inform and guide the general will, and by
enacting a piece of legislation far removed from the common interest, the
legislature failed to uphold its responsibility under Rousseau’s social contract.
This disconnect further erodes any argument that the PPACA has a legitimate
place within America’s social contract.
II. THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA
Studies and statistics reveal that health care in America has significant flaws.
Currently, annual health care spending in America totals $2.6 trillion. 139 This
amounts to nearly 18 % of the annual GDP, or roughly $8,402 per American. 140
The Government Accountability Office estimates at least $25 trillion is needed
to fund Medicare’s future intergenerational obligations. 141 While the United
States outspends every other country in health care spending, 142 it only ranks
twenty-seventh in life expectancy and thirty-first in health care coverage. 143
Health care costs are also the number one cause of bankruptcy. 144 In 2007,
62% of those filing for personal bankruptcy cited medical costs as the primary
reason. 145 This number has risen at a alarming rate: in 1981, a mere 8% of
individuals filing for bankruptcy cited medical costs as the primary reason. 146
According to a five-state study, by 2001, the number jumped to 50%. 147
Remarkably, the majority of the respondents had private insurance. 148 Even
with insurance, however, individuals paid, on average, an additional $17,749 in

137. Healthcare System, supra note 116.
138. Id. The other choices were: “minor changes” (29%); “major changes” (24%); “repealed
entirely” (32%); and, “no opinion” (3%). Id.
139. See Ingram, supra note 135.
140. Id.; see generally Steve Brill, Bitter Pill: Why Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Mar.
4, 2013 at 16 (exploring the problem of high healthcare costs in the United States).
141. Bryan R. Lawrence, Tell Americans the Real Cost of Medicare, WASH. POST, May 31,
2012, at A15; see Holtz-Eakin & Ramlet, supra note 128, at 1138–39 (highlighting overall budget
problems with the implementation of healthcare reform and predicting that Medicare will not be
able to operate at a reduced budget).
142. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Spending More Doesn’t Make Us Healthier, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
2011, 12:53 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/spending-more-doesn’t-make
-us-healthier/?_r=0&pagewanted=print.
143. See Ingram, supra note 135.
144. Catherine Arnst, Study Links Medical Costs and Personal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (June 4, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily
/dnflash/content/jun2009/db2009064_666715.htm (stating that Harvard researchers found the
majority of “personal bankruptcies . . . in 2007” were healthcare related.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.

18

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1

out-of-pocket expenses. 149 The rising costs of health care and its detrimental
effect on the economy underscore the need for change, but as observed, the
PPACA is not the answer. An emphasis on prevention and personal
accountability, rather than legislation, could significantly curb health care
related expenses. 150
Recent surveys indicate that Americans are dissatisfied with the current health
care system. The percentage of Americans that believe the U.S. health care
system “has major problems” has remained high: 52 % of those polled in
September, 1994, chose this response, and 57 % chose the same in November
2011. 151 Yet, the issue appears to be related to coverage, not quality. In response
to a November 2011 Gallup poll, a mere 6 % of those surveyed responded that
the health care coverage in this country was “excellent.” 152 In contrast, 20 %
found the general quality of health care to be “excellent,” and 40 % believed the
specific health care they received was “excellent.” 153 While the quality of health
care in America is viewed positively, issues regarding coverage and expense still
remain.
A. Moral Hazard
A universal health care system with an individual mandate, financed through
taxing individuals and syphoning funds from Medicare, can lead to problems
associated with moral hazard. 154 Moral hazard is a term that refers to the reduced
incentive to prevent loss due to insurance against that loss. 155 Once people are
149. Id.
150. See infra Section II.A. In order to cut costs, some have turned to crowd fundin” to raise
additional money for healthcare costs. Since 2008, people have raised $8.8 million in funding using
the website GiveForward. Julia Sisler, Crowdfunding for Medical Expenses, CANADIAN MED.
ASS’N.
J.,
Feb.
7,
2012,
at
E123,
E123-24,
available
at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3273528/pdf/184e123.pdf.
151. Healthcare System, supra note 116.
152. Id. The other choices were: Good (27%); only fair (41%); poor (24%); no opinion
(2%). Id.
153. Id. The other choices were: Good (39%); only fair (29%); poor (11%); no opinion
(1%). Id.
154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 786 (9th ed. 2009) (stating that “[t]he risk that an insured
will destroy property or allow it to be destroyed ([usually] by burning) in order to collect the
insurance proceeds is a moral hazard. Also, an insured’s potential interest, if any, in the burning
of the property is sometimes called a moral hazard.”) Webster’s Dictionary defines “moral hazard”
as “the possibility of loss to an insurance company arising from the character or circumstances of
the insured.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 756 (10th ed. 1997); see also
Allard E. Dembe & Leslie I. Boden, Moral Hazard: A Question of Morality?, 10 NEW SOLUTIONS:
J. ENVT’L & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POL’Y 257, 258–72 (2000) (exploring the historical roots of
moral hazard as a value-neutral concept or as a pejorative connotation used in describing the
propensity of some employees to exercise less caution in the workplace to enhance their
opportunities to recover from workplace injuries under worker compensation claims).
155. See, e.g., Cassandra Jones Havard, African-American Farmers and Fair Lending:
Racializing Rural Economic Space, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 339 (2001) (referring to the
borrower’s incentives to take risks or not depending on the interest rate of the loan).
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protected from the negative consequences of their actions, they engage in riskier
behavior. 156 In the context of health care, the term is used to refer to the
decreased incentive to engage in healthy practices as a result of universal health
care. 157 People who engage in unhealthy behaviors have a decreased incentive
to improve their health once they are no longer accountable for the additional
expenses that arise from their health problems. Akin to a free-rider problem, in
which one person benefits equally from the efforts of others at no cost, those
who are healthy will be required to pay for the additional health costs of
others. 158 Not only is this an additional burden on the health care system, it
disincentivizes healthy habits. 159
Obesity provides a prime example of moral hazard. According to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, from 2009–2010, more than one-third of
American adults were obese. 160 A recent study conducted at Duke University
projected that by 2030, nearly 42% of all Americans will be obese. 161 Obesity
contributes to heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and many other leading causes of
death. 162 As of 2008, obesity-related medical expenses were estimated to be

156. Dembe & Boden, supra note 154, at 257.
157. See id. at 266.
158. SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM 172-73
(2013).
159. See Cass R. Sunstein, It’s For Your Own Good, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 7, 2013, at 8
(challenging John Stuart Mill’s principle of autonomy by arguing for extending the boundaries of
paternalism in health matters when individual action forces large expenditures of public funds for
subsequent care and citing the “individual mandate” in the PPACA as a proper exercise of
paternalism); see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 495 (8th ed. 2011)
(concluding that market forces “cannot be counted on to optimize the level of obesity in society”).
Rather than rely totally on ordinances designed to control obesity by regulating food menus in
restaurants and the sale of items in grocery stores, promoting consumer education in healthy living
and food consumption may be more important than any direct efforts taken to control obesity by
enacting local ordinances. Id. at 495-96; Christine Fry, Sara Zimmerman & Manel Kappagoda,
Healthy Reform, Healthy Cities: Using Law and Policy to Reduce Obesity Rates in Underserved
Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1265 (2013); Jeff Stier & Henry I. Miller, Free Market Offers
Real Solutions to Obesity Crisis, WASH. EXAMINER (May 20, 2013, 2:20 PM), available at
http://washingtonexaminer.com/op-ed-free-market-has-real-solutions-to-obesity
-crisis/article/2530083. But see John B. Hoke, Note, Parens Patriae: A Flawed Strategy for
State-initiated Obesity Litigation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1753, 1788 (2013) (arguing that
legislation is the solution to America’s obesity epidemic); Christine L. Kuss, Comment, Absolving
a Deadly Sin: A Medical and Legal Argument for Including Obesity as a Disability under the
Americans with Disability Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 563, 603–05 (1996) (arguing
that obesity should be considered a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and that
extensive regulations should be enforced to curtail it).
160. CYNTHIA L. OGDEN, ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PREVALENCE OF
OBESITY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
2009–2010
1
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datat/databriefs/db82.pdf.
161. Melissa Healy, No End in Sight to Obesity Epidemic, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2012, at AA1.
162. Id.
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$147 billion. 163 Over the next twenty years, experts project these expenses to
reach $550 billion. 164 In 2006, obesity-related conditions cost third-party payers
an additional $1,429 for each obese person, compared to a person of normal
weight. 165
Even assuming the federal government will bear a small fraction of the
additional obesity-related costs as a result of a universal health care system,
incurring the costs of an individual’s unhealthy behavior provides the
government with a legitimate argument to regulate and define what is healthy,
and what people can eat. Although obesity can be a result of a genetic disorder,
there is no question that personal choice is a large part of the problem. 166 Under
a universal health care system, the federal government will be forced to either
increase taxes or divert funds from other health care programs like Medicare to
pay for the additional costs that could otherwise be prevented. 167 Legislation
within Rousseau’s social contract should not burden some members in order to
confer additional benefits on others. 168 The PPACA confers benefits to some at
the expense of others by syphoning funds from Medicare and therefore, reducing
benefits for senior citizens in order to pay for avoidable health conditions.
Indeed, this inequality has been termed the “flaw of Obamacare,” because “it
forces some Americans under penalty of law, to carry a larger and larger share
of the price of other Americans’ health care, through higher premiums and
mandates on new taxes.” 169
163. Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Annual Medical Spending Attributable to Obesity: Payer–And
Service–Specific Estimates, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w822, w822 (2009).
164. Healy, supra note 161.
165. Finkelstein, supra note 163, at 826.
166. See Obesity and Genetics, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 19,
2010), http://www.cdc.gov/features/obesity/ (noting that, while genes can have an impact on
obesity, the rapid rise in obesity cannot be attributed solely to changes in genetics).
167. See CHAIKIND, supra note 87, at 4. For example, the PPACA, which expands
significantly Medicaid eligibility, is financed by both increasing tax revenue and diverting funds
from Medicare. Id.
168. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 76; see also Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich,
Weighing Status: Obesity, Class and Health Reform, 89 ORE. L. REV. 1113, 1115–16 (2011)
(discussing Obamacare’s limited response to obesity and to discrimination based on class). See
generally Y. Tony Yang & Len M. Nichols, Obesity and Health System Reform: Private vs. Public
Responsibility, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 380 (2011) (analyzing the PPACA’s “new
freedoms . . . grant[ed] to employers and health plans to use financial incentives for [employee]
participation in wellness programs that emphasize promote good weight control,” disease
prevention, and maintenance of certain health standards).
169. Editorial, Obamacare Isn’t Reducing Healthcare Costs, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 25,
2012 6:45 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/2509026.
See Dave Boyer, Obamacare’s Bold Vision Turns Murky: Health Reform Downsized, Promises
TIMES,
Nov.
28,
2013,
Broken,
WASH.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/28/obamacares-bold-vision-turnsmurky/?page=all. The effect of the Supreme Court’s construction of the PPACA’s penalty for
noncompliance as a tax will serve to “severely limit[] the ability of the new health-care regime to
cope with its own predictable consequences.” George F. Will, The Time Bomb in Obamacare?,
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Universal health care increases moral hazard. The PPACA will give the
federal government an even greater role in regulating health and further erode
personal choice, autonomy, and individualism. It disincentivizes personal
responsibility and healthy choices at the expense of taxpayers and other
government programs such as Medicare.
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S APPROPRIATE ROLE IN HEALTH CARE
In crafting public health policy, the federal government should closely follow
Rousseau’s guidance. Rousseau writes that the general will is “less from the
number of voices than from the common interest uniting them.” 170 In
accordance with this guidance, the federal government should begin by
determining the nation’s common interest. One way to do this is through a
process proposed by Andrew Lister called “zooming out.” 171 Zooming out is an
approach used to analyze an agreement within the social contact by examining
the policy along a continuum starting from the proposed agreement. 172 Thus,
the starting point for health care is the PPACA. Recent surveys indicate that
public support for the PPACA hovers between 40 and 50%. 173 When public
support of some other basic level of health care, such as Medicaid, is “zoomed
out” and examined, actual public support is much higher. 174
One pollster commented that surveys confirmed that there is “wide
recognition that the system, if not necessarily broken, is breaking.” 175 He further
opined: “It’s just that once you get down to specifics, that coalition of people
who want to change the system breaks down.” 176 Thus, in addition to educating
and leading the public, the legislature should seek to implement a policy
somewhere along the continuum that reflects the legitimate general will without
“zooming in” to a point that no longer reflects the general will. Legislatures
should be aware that the greatest health care-related concern is cost, not
availability. 177 When implementing a policy, the government should engage in
an open discourse with the populace and seek to educate the public about the
risks and long-term consequences of legislation.

WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2013, at A25; see also Daniel P. Kessler, ObamaCare’s Broken Promises,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2013, at A13 (predicting that non-group insurance subscriber’s premiums will
rise under ObamaCare).
170. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 76.
171. Andrew Lister, Public Justification and the Limits of State Action, 9 POL., PHIL. & ECON.
151, 157–58 (2010).
172. Id.
173. See Healthcare System, supra note 116, at 2.
174. See id. at 1–2. The poll was conducted between January 14–16, 2011. 7% of those
surveyed expressed no opinion. Id.
175. Ingram, supra note 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See Healthcare System, supra note 116, at 44–45. 38% responded that cost is the most
significant issue, while only 15% identified coverage as the largest problem. Id.
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Next, when developing policy, the federal government must act within the
boundaries of its powers. Rousseau writes that “the sovereign has never any
right to impose greater burdens on one subject than on another.” 178 Likewise,
the federal government should craft policy that does not impose greater duties
on one group than another. One group cannot be taxed more than another in
order to finance the program. A policy should not deplete one group’s existin
health care resource for the benefit of another group. The PPACA violates this
premise by depleting Medicare resources, and thus imposing additional burdens
on the elderly. 179
The policy must bind and favor all citizens equally, bearing in mind that these
policies must be built on a common interest. 180 This does not mean that the
government should select one form of health care that is binding on everyone.
Rather, it means that the minimum level of health care, as determined by the
general will and without favoring or burdening one group, should be available
to all, should they desire it. Under the PPACA, those who wish to “opt out”
must pay a fine. 181 By the very nature of requiring one party to pay a fine in
order to finance a portion of the PPACA, the federal government is burdening
one group for the benefit of another group.
Further, states must be given substantial autonomy to determine the needs of
its citizens. Rousseau warned repeatedly of the dangers of large governments. 182
Administration “becomes more difficult over great distances [and] [g]overnment
becomes more burdensome,” ultimately resulting in waste and inefficiency. 183
In order to preserve the integrity of a policy and guard against waste and
inefficiency, the states – rather than the federal government – must be allowed
to determine the needs of its citizens. For example, obesity varies by state. 184 A
2010 study showed that roughly 23% of the Hawaiian population was considered
obese, while in Mississippi, 34% of the state was obese. 185 A blanket provision
that suits the needs of Mississippi would create waste in Hawaii. Thus, health

178. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 77.
179. See CHAIKIND, supra note 87, at 4; see also Leonard J. Nelson III, Rationing Health Care
in Britain and the United States, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 175, 225 (2011) (speculating on the
probability of PPACA’s cost containment as an ineffective mechanism for reducing costs over the
long run); Kessler, supra note 169 (explaining that the largest source of revenue will come form
cuts made to Medicare).
180. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62 at 69.
181. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
182. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 90.
183. Id. at 90–91.
184. Adult Obesity Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Aug. 16,
2013), available at, http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html. While each state is empowered
to devise its own lists and guidelines for determining what is necessary health care (e.g., doctor
visits, maternity care, prescription drugs, etc.), they must draw from ten broad categories. Sarah
Kliff, A Puzzle for States: What is Necessary Health care?, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2012, at A1.
185. See Adult Obesity Facts, supra note 184.
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care provisions must be controlled by and individually tailored to the needs of
each state.
The problems associated with moral hazard should be borne in mind. The
government’s ultimate goal should be to promote health, but this should not be
done at the gross expense of others. Programs should focus on education and
prevention, and addressing health problems before they emerge. Rather than
only combating the effects of obesity in adults, there should also be initiatives
directed at the youth that incentivize healthy decisions and lifestyles.
Encouraging healthy decisions at a young age would result in a healthier
population at a lower cost. 186 By focusing on preventing and detecting health
problems in their incipiency, the government can turn the tide on the current
health care crisis.
Finally, if there is doubt regarding specific provisions within a piece of
legislation — assuming the legislation otherwise complies with Rousseau’s
guidance — Congress should weigh the gravity of the harm produced against
the utility of the provisions to be enacted. The Second Restatement of Torts
provides a variety of elements, several of which can be applied with slight
modification, to legislative proposals. 187 Regarding the gravity of harm,
Congress should consider the extent of the harm involved, the character of the
harm, and the social value that society attributes to what is harmed. 188 When
determining the utility of the provision, Congress should analyze the social value
that society attaches to the goal of the provision, the suitability of the provision
to the character of the people, and whether there is a less invasive measure to
accomplish the goal.
Rousseau viewed the wise lawgiver as one who “begins not by laying down
laws good in themselves, but by finding out whether the people for whom the

186. See JOHNS HOPKINS CNTR. FOR LIVABLE FUTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON CHILDHOOD
OBESITY PREVENTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 9
(2007), available at http://www.jhsph.edu/research/center-and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for
-a-livable-future/_pdf/research/clf_reports/childhoodobesity.pdf (explaining the positive benefits
of school-based interventions).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979). The Restatement provides the
following elements when determining the gravity of harm:
(a) The extent of the harm involved;
(b) the character of the harm involved
(c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the
locality; and
(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.
Id. at § 827.
When determining the utility of conduct, the Restatement provides the following elements: “(a) the
social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the
conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the
invasion.” Id. at § 828.
188. Id. § 827.

24

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1

laws are intended is able to support them.” 189 After analyzing the factors of both
the gravity of the harm and the utility of the provision, the legislature should
weigh them against one another. If the utility of the provision outweighs the
extent of the harm produced, and the provision is otherwise in accord with the
tenets of America’s social contract, it should be enacted.
IV. THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD: RATIONING THE HEALTH
CARE OF AMERICA’S GREATEST GENERATION
In Book 12 of The Odyssey, the goddess, Circes, warned captain Odysseus
that if a man hears the Song of the Sirens, “his wife and children will never
welcome him home again.” 190 Odysseus instructed his men to fill their ears with
wax and bind him to the mast of the ship, so that when he heard the Sirens and
fell into madness, he would be restrained from leaping to his death. 191
In an effort to curb Medicare spending, Congress has also bound itself to the
mast, restricting its ability to act, and placed the health care of American seniors
into the hands of the fifteen individuals who comprise the IPAB. Created by a
simple majority in Congress, the Board can only be repealed by a super-majority
vote. 192 Shielded from judicial review, the appointed Board wields the power
of the elected legislature. 193 The structure and power of the IPAB undermines
the fundamental purpose of the separation of powers within a democracy. 194
This total abdication of responsibility poses a grave and immediate threat to
Medicare beneficiaries, and will ultimately result in the indirect rationing of
health care at the hands of an inscrutable, unaccountable Board.
A. The Benefits and The Burdens of Medicare
Medicare is a government program that provides insurance to Americans who
are sixty-five and older. 195 Created in 1965, Medicare represents a commitment

189. ROUSSEAU, supra note 62, at 88. See generally Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism,
and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 459 (2007) (analyzing the implications of
federalism).
190. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 145 (Samuel Butler trans., Orange St. Press Classics 1998),
available at http://www.sparks.eserver.org/books/odyssey.pdf.
191. Id.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(f)(2)(F) (Supp. V 2012) (requiring an affirmative vote of three-fifths
of the Senate in order to dissolve the IPAB).
193. Id. § 1395kkk(c)(5). See generally Michael H. Cook, Independent Payment Advisory
Board—Part of the Solution for Bending the Cost Curve?, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI., Oct. 2010, at
102.
194. DIANE COHEN & MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INSTITUTE, THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT
ADVISORY BOARD: PPACA’S ANTI-CONSTITUTIONAL AND AUTHORITARIAN SUPERLEGISLATURE 13–14 (2012), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf
/PA700.pdf.
195. Lori Montgomery, Good and Bad News for Medicare, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2011, at
A1.
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between generations that reflects both human and capital investment. 196 Nearly
forty-six million seniors currently rely on the program for health care. 197
However, Medicare spending is growing at an alarming rate. 198 From
1985-2009 Medicare spending increased at an annual rate of 8.5%. 199 Since
2002 alone, Medicare spending has grown by 68% 200 and now accounts for
“nearly 13% of the federal budget.” 201 In conjunction with Medicaid and Social
Security, these three programs amount to roughly 44% of the federal budget. 202
Medicare enrollment is also on the rise. Between 2000 and 2005, enrollment
increased 1.3%, and from 2006 to 2010, enrollment increased 2.5%. 203 As more
baby boomers become eligible for Medicare, the enrollment figures are expected
to continue to swell tremendously. 204 One study predicts that the total number
of enrollees will double over the next two decades, as roughly 10,000 baby
boomers become eligible for Medicare each day. 205 However, another study
predicts that it will be forty years before enrollment doubles. 206 Likewise,
individual Medicare beneficiaries are also becoming more expensive. Between

196. GEORGE P. SMITH, II, LEGAL AND HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY 16 (1996).
See generally Andrew H. Smith & John Rother, Older Americans and the Rationing of Health Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1852–55 (1992) (criticizing the “intergenerational justice” argument for
rationing healthcare).
AGENDA,
197. Issue
Guide:
Medicare,
PUBLIC
http://www.publicagendaarchives.org/citizens/issueguides/medicare (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
198. See Montgomery, supra note 195, at A6.
199. LISA POTETZ ET AL., MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING: A PRIMER 1–2 (2011),
available at http://www.kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/7731–03.pdf.
200. Alison Acosta Fraser, Federal Spending by the Numbers—2012, HERITAGE FOUNDATION
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/federal-spending-by-the
-numbers-2012. Likewise, Medicaid has grown 38 % since 2002. Id.
201. Issue Guide: Medicare, supra note 199.
202. Fraser, supra note 200.
203. JOHN HOLAHAN & STACEY MCMORROW, URBAN INSTITUTE, MEDICARE, MEDICAID
AND THE DEFICIT DEBATE: TIMELY ANALYSIS OF HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 3 (2012), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/412544-Medicare-Medicaid-and-the-Deficit-Debate.pdf.
Congress established the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) in 1997 and
directed the Commission to report to it each year on the accessibility and the quality of care that
beneficiaries are receiving from Medicare providers and to offer suggestions for improvement of
the program. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–33, § 4022, 111 Stat. 251, 350–55
(1997); About MedPac, MEDPAC, http://www.medpac.gov/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
204. Montgomery, supra note 195, at A1–A6.
205. Id. Yet, physicians are beginning to ration services to Medicare recipients at significant
rates—with 67.2 % of physician practices giving consideration to limiting new patients and
49.5% considering refusing to take new Medicare patients. Douglas Holtz Eakin, IPAB and
Medicare Costs Are Bad Medicine, POLITICO (Mar. 22, 2012, 9:201 PM), available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/74366.html.
206. Doug Trapp, Latest Medicare Projections Renew Alarm on Long-Term Sustainability,
AM. MED. NEWS, April 14, 2008, at 1. See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Independent
Medicare Advisory Board, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 21 (2011).
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1985 and 2008, per enrollee expenditures rose 6.3 % per year. 207 This rapid
growth in spending and enrollment threatens both the Medicare Program and
America’s economic development.
B. The Goal of Affordable Care
Reflecting a belief that universal health care is a central tenet in America’s
social contract, President Obama and Congress enacted the PPACA. 208 This
expansive piece of legislation increased health care coverage, expanded
Medicaid eligibility, implemented new private health insurance market
requirements, and created health insurance exchanges for individuals and small
businesses. 209 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Joint Committee
on Taxation (JCT) estimated that an additional thirty to thirty-three million
Americans would receive health care as a result of the PPACA. 210 The CBO
and the JCT also estimated that the net costs of the insurance and Medicaid
provisions would be $1.1 trillion over the next decade. 211 While PPACA
proponents believed that the Act would ultimately reduce the federal deficit and
federal health care costs, those eventual savings are far more attenuated than the
more concrete and immediate net costs of the PPACA. 212 To curb rising
Medicare costs and offset the new subsidies and Medicaid provisions, the
PPACA will syphon funds from Medicare and raise taxes. 213

207. JIM HAHN & CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41511, THE
INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter IPAB REPORT] (emphasis
added).
208. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(to be codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
209. C. STEPHEN REDHEAD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41664, ACA: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF THE LAW, IMPLEMENTATION, AND LEGAL CHALLENGES 1 (2012).
210. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 3 (2012) [hereinafter CBO MARCH ESTIMATES],
available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-Coverage%20Estimates
.pdf.
211. Id. at 1.
212. Democrats estimate the total cost to be under $1 trillion over the next ten years, while
Republicans believe the correct number is $2.3 trillion. Ezra Klein, Paul Ryan and the True Cost
of Healthcare Reform, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2010, 5:26 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com
/ezraklein/2010/03/paul_ryan_and_the_true_cost_of.html.
213. CBO MARCH ESTIMATES, supra note 210, at 2. Initially, the PPACA attempted to expand
state Medicaid programs by threatening to withdraw states’ federal Medicaid matching funds if
they failed to comply with the terms of the expansion. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012). This coercive practice was held to be unconstitutional. Id. Thus, if the
federal government cannot withdraw funds for failure to comply, the actual cost of expanding
Medicaid will likely be much greater than initially projected. See id.
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C. The Board’s Scope of Authority
In order to reduce the per capita growth in Medicare expenses, Congress
created the IPAB as part of the PPACA. 214 The IPAB is composed of fifteen
appointed members. 215 It is a unique creation that simultaneously concentrates
legislative authority in an executive organization, while shielding its actions
from judicial review. 216 As a result, the structure and mission of the Board
undermines the basic principles of separation of powers 217 and poses an
inevitable threat to current and future Medicare beneficiaries and the overall
state of health care in the United States. 218
The IPAB is empowered to use price control strategies to limit the use of
expensive treatments. 219 Although the IPAB may not engage in direct health
care rationing, its reimbursement policies will have the implicit and ultimate
effect of rationing treatment. Thus, in the event “the board decides to set
payment for state-of-the-art dialysis at below cost, reasoning that the benefits of
the procedure aren’t commensurate with the added expense, it isn’t rationing
care directly.” 220 Yet, under such a policy patients would be treated with less
expensive, but older, treatments. 221
D. The Structure of the Board
The Board is comprised of fifteen members appointed by the President, with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 222 Upon appointment, each member serves
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b) (Supp. V 2012).
215. Id. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A)(i).
216. See Cohen & Cannon, supra note 194, at 12–13. The idea of a health board that would
recommend government coverage decisions based on comparative effectiveness research surfaced
some time ago. Various proposals over the years were designed to create a health care governing
board that would make coverage and payment decisions based on effectiveness and efficiency. Jost,
supra note 206, at 21–22. Former U.S. Senator, Tim Daschle, long-championed the expansion of
the Federal Health Benefits Program, which would have allowed a Federal Health Board to utilize
NIH research on evidence–based drugs and medical procedures to advocate recommendations for
efficiencies of scale within government insurance benefits. TOM DASCHLE, CRITICAL: WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 170–72 (2008).
217. See Cohen & Cannon, supra note 194, at 13.
218. Id. at 5.
219. Shika Dalmia, Romney Should Keep Focus on IPAB, WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 11, 2012,
3:34 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/2510511.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2012). The Board will be comprised of
“individuals with national recognition for their expertise in health finance and economics, actuarial
science, health facility management, health plans and integrated delivery systems, reimbursement
of health facilities, allopathic and osteopathic physicians, and other providers of health services,
and other related fields.” Id. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(B)(i). In addition to other types of healthcare
professionals, the PPACA mandates that the Board will include “representatives of consumers and
the elderly.” Id. §§ 1395kkk(g)(1)(B)(ii). However, members cannot be concurrently employed
while serving on the Board. Id. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(D). It is unclear whether “advice and consent of
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a six-year term and is limited to two consecutive terms. 223 The IPAB members
are completely isolated from the public and Congress—they can only be
removed by the President for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office. 224 This
isolation is purportedly to shield Board members from special interest influence,
yet unlike other federal employees, Board members are expressly permitted to
“accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of services or property.” 225 In
reality, their isolation prevents the members from being held accountable for
their actions by either the public or Congress. While a similar protection exists
for Article III judges, 226 it is wholly inappropriate and inapplicable to extend this
shield to the Board, given the Board’s mission and the sweeping effect of the
Board’s proposals.
Commencing April 30, 2013, the Chief Actuary for the Centers of Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) must determine whether the projected Medicare
per capita growth rate will exceed the projected Medicare per capita target
growth rate for the implementation year. 227 The implementation year on which
these projections and targets are based is two years later; therefore, for 2013, the
implementation year is 2015. 228 If the projected growth rate exceeds the target
growth rate, it triggers the Board’s proposal requirements. 229 Beginning in 2018,
the target growth rate will become commensurate with economic growth. 230
It is highly probable that the Board will be required to submit cost reduction
proposals every year. The Chief Actuary applied this formula to Medicare
growth over the past twenty-five years and determined that, had the IPAB been
in existence, the proposal requirement would have been triggered in all but four
years. 231 In light of this conclusion, the overwhelming growth in Medicare
expenditures over the last two decades, and the increased enrollment figures, it
is inevitable that the Board will be required to reduce the annual growth of
Medicare.

the Senate” requires the Senate to approve each member by vote, or whether the President is merely
obligated to disclose his appointees to the Senate. Id. § 1395kkk(g)(1)(A)(i).
223. Id. § 1395kkk(g)(2).
224. Id. § 1395kkk(g)(4).
225. Id. § 1395kkk(i)(5).
226. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(1). The Medicare per capita growth rate is the “projected 5–year
average (ending with such year) of the growth in Medicare program spending.” Id.
§ 1395kkk(c)(6)(B)(i). For a detailed table that outlines the Board’s obligations by date, see IPAB
REPORT, supra note 207, at App. A.
228. IPAB REPORT, supra note 207, at App. A.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(b)(2).
230. Id. § 1395kkk(c)(8).
231. IPAB REPORT, supra note 207, at 11 (citing Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief
Actuary, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” as Amended 10
(Apr.
22,
2010),
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and
-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf.
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E. “Stacking the Deck” in the Board’s Favor
On January 15 of each “trigger” year, the Board must submit detailed
proposals to Congress and the President that will result in a “net reduction in
total Medicare program expenditures . . . that are at least equal to the applicable
savings target established by the Chief Actuary.” 232 If the Board fails to submit
a proposal, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) will
submit a proposal. 233 These proposals then become law on August 15th and will
be implemented by the Secretary. 234
Similar to Odysseus, Congress included a variety of hurdles within the
PPACA to restrict its own ability to alter the Board’s proposals. The proposals
do not require Congressional approval and will become law, unless Congress
enacts legislation that reduces Medicare expenditures by at least the same level
as the proposals. 235 In addition to abolishing the need for ratification of the
Board’s proposals, the PPACA includes a second hurdle for Congress: any piece
of legislation that augments or replaces the Board’s proposals must be approved
by both the House and three-fifths of the Senate. 236 Dissolving the Board
requires a joint resolution supported by a super-majority vote from both the
House and Senate. 237 Finally, once the Board’s proposals become effective, it
is shielded from judicial review. 238
The multitude of procedural impediments was clearly intended to restrict
Congress’ ability to act or amend the proposals before they become law. As a
recent Congressional Research Service Report stated, “[t]he arguable and
perhaps intended effect of the procedures in the [PPACA] is to favor the
continuation of the IPAB and its recommendations even in the face of significant
opposition in both chambers of Congress.” 239 The PPACA passed with the
support of 50 % of the House and 60 % of the Senate. 240 However, any piece of
legislation that augments or abolishes the powers delegated to the IPAB under
the PPACA requires a super-majority vote. 241
Allowing a simple majority to enact a law that can only be repealed by a supermajority undermines the very purpose of a representative democracy. Further,
232. Id. at 12.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(5).
234. Id. § 1395kkk(e)(1).
235. Id. § 1395kkk(e)(3); see also IPAB REPORT, supra note 207, at 17.
236. Id. § 1395kkk(d)(3)(D).
237. Id. § 1395kkk(f)(2)(F).
238. Id. § 1395kkk(e)(5). The provision expressly states: “There shall be no administrative or
judicial review under section 1395ff of this title, section 1395oo of this title, or otherwise of the
implementation by the Secretary under this subsection of the recommendations contained in a
proposal.” Id.
239. IPAB REPORT, supra note 207, at 23 (emphasis added).
240. Health Care Bill Passes in House, CBS NEWS (Mar. 21, 2010, 10:33 PM), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/21/politics/main6321210.shtml.
241. IPAB REPORT, supra note 207, at 22.
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giving an unelected Board the powers of the legislature and shielding it from
judicial review effectively strips the barriers that separate the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government, and puts the lives of elderly
Americans in the hands of fifteen people. Unlike other regulatory commission
decisions and proposed rules that allow public comment and judicial appeals, 242
the IPAB’s decisions become law unless either Congress proposes equivalent
spending cuts, or both houses (including a Senate super majority of three-fifths)
waive the board’s determination and the President signs the waiver. 243 The
Board’s structure and power effectively dissolves the checks and balances that
are the hallmarks of American democracy.
F. Patient-Centered Research
Created as a part of the PPACA, The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute (“Institute”) is a nonprofit corporation that is neither a government
agency nor a federal government establishment. 244 It is meant to set comparative
effectiveness research priorities and to assess “clinical effectiveness, risks, and
benefits of two or more medical treatments, services, and items” 245 in order to
evaluate the “different characteristics of treatment modalities that may affect
research outcomes” 246 and be “used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis
of, or prevention of illness or injury.” 247
To accomplish its purpose of assisting the public “in making informed health
decisions,” the Institute is tasked with a variety of duties including identifying

242. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 138–39 (2013) (surveying the power of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in reviewing administrative decision making, and cautioning
against its abuse and over-exercise of presidential authority in regulating law making conduct); see
also ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53–55, 445–47 (2d.
ed. 2001) (explaining the right to comment and judicial review). See generally Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799
(2010) (discussing the reasonableness of judicial review of agency decisions).
243. Dalmia, supra note 219.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012). See generally James Dabney Miller, The
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI., Oct. 2010, at 4.
245. Id. § 1320e(a)(2)(A); see also Aaron Klein, More evidence of ‘Death Panels’ in
ObamaCare: Rationing Concerns Based on Age, Race, Ethnicity, WND (Jan. 5, 2013, 7:43 PM),
http://www.wnd.com/2013/01/more-evidence-of-death-panels-in-obamacare/.
See generally
Robert Coleman, Comment, The Independent Medicare Advisory Committee: Death Panel or
Smart Governing?, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 235 (2010).
Interestingly, at least sixteen health systems in developed countries—including Australia, Canada,
Germany, and Great Britain—have comparative effectiveness programs that assist identifying the
difference between effective and ineffective care. Paul H. Keckley & Barbara B. Frink,
Comparative Effectiveness: A Strategic Perspective on What It Is and What It May Mean for the
United States, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI., Oct. 2009, at 53, 56.
246. 17 U.S.C. § 1320e(d)(2)(E).
247. Id. U.S.C. § 1320e(a)(2)(B).
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research priorities and establishing a research policy agenda. 248 Once these
priorities are identified, the Institute conducts primary research studies, as well
as contracts research studies with public entities, academic institutions, and
private sector groups. 249 The findings are made available for peer review, and
then released to clinicians, patients, and the general public. 250 Ultimately, the
Institute has the authority to determine and prioritize health care issues in the
United States, as well as the financial resources used to fund medical research. 251
And, because of this power, the Institute has been likened to the National
Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE), which is a part of the United
Kingdom’s National Health Service. 252 NICE sets, monitors, and distributes
health care resources in the UK. It is criticized for being heavily influenced by
cost-effectiveness standards, rather than clinical effectiveness. 253 Given the
similarities between NICE and the Institute, the Institute is also at risk for
focusing on cutting costs at the expense of clinical effectiveness.
V. THE INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCES OF IPAB REGULATION ON MEDICARE
The IPAB is expressly prohibited from submitting proposals that will “ration
health care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary premiums . . . increase
Medicare beneficiary cost-sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and
copayments), or otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility criteria.” 254
Although the PPACA proscribes rationing, it does not define rationing or the
types of Board proposals that would violate this directive. 255 Even if the Board

248. Id. § 1320e(c)–(d)(9). In order to adopt the research priorities identified, there must be a
public comment period, and the priorities must be adopted by a majority vote of the Board
members. Id. § 1320e(d)(9).
249. Id. § 1320e(d)(2)(A)-(B). Research reports are not permitted to include, inter alia,
“practice guidelines, coverage recommendations, payment, or policy recommendations.” Id.
§ 1320e(d)(8)(A)(iv).
250. Id. § 1320e(d)(7)–(8).
251. See Nelson, supra note 179, at 215.
252. See id. at 178, 210. The official website for NICE is: http://www.nice.org.uk.
253. Nelson, supra note 179, at 210–11. Under efforts taken by England’s current Prime
Minister, David Cameron, in 2010, the powers of NICE to disapprove drugs based on
cost-effectiveness has been weakened substantially and returned to clinical physicians, thus
signaling a retreat from public rationing and a return to implicit rationing. Id. at 211–12; see
JONATHAN HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 72-78 (4th ed. 2012); JONATHAN HERRING,
CARING AND THE LAW 176-80 (2013) [hearinafter CARING AND THE LAW].
254. 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2012). But see Jacqueline Fox, The Hidden
Role of Cost: Medical Decisions, Transparency and Public Trust, 79 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 4–5,
15–17 (2010) (arguing Medicare practices “stealth rationing” by utilizing National Coverage
Determination which allows it to refuse to cover use of expensive new technologies).
255. Scott W. Atlas, IPAB: President Obama’s NICE Way to Ration Care to Seniors, FORBES
(Oct. 21, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottatlas/2012/10/21/ipab-president
-obamas-nice-way-to-ration-care-to-seniors/. See generally BEATRIX HOFFMAN, HEALTH CARE
FOR SOME: RIGHTS AND RATIONING IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1930 (2012); Cook, supra note
193.
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banned certain basic procedures for individuals based solely on age—a clear
example of rationing 256—the judicial shield surrounding Board proposals would
severely curtail any remedy. Assuming for the purposes of this Article that the
Board will not directly ration health care, indirect rationing is the only means by
which the Board can curb Medicare growth to the extent required.
A. Indirect Rationing
As baby boomers begin to retire at unprecedented rates, the number of
Medicare enrollees will increase tremendously in the immediate future. 257
Likewise, current enrollees are living longer as a result of medical
advancements, and thus incurring increased health care costs. 258 Despite this
certain increased demand for services, the Chief Actuary expects the IPAB to
ultimately cut net Medicare expenditures by 11% by 2019. 259 In order to
accomplish this goal in the face of increased coverage demand, the Board will
need to drastically cut Medicare expenditures to continue to provide coverage to
Medicare beneficiaries. The main tool that will be used to cut Medicare
expenditures is the Board’s authority to reduce provider payment rates. 260
Indeed, of the $575 billion in net Medicare savings that the PPACA is expected
to facilitate over the next decade, $233 billion is expected to come from provider
payment freezes and reductions. 261 The inevitability of payment cuts is
illustrated by the following paradigm:
Suppose that in Year 1, 10,000 Medicare patients require
chemotherapy treatment at a market cost of $10,000 per patient. The
total cost to Medicare would be $100 million. Given the rapid increase
in enrollment figures, by Year 3 there are projected to be 11,000
256. See Smith, supra note 33, at 427–28; see also Sally Pipes, Op-Ed., For Cancer
Treatments, A Rationing Trap, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 9, 2013, 2:00 PM), available at
http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/2518040 (discussing the efforts to curb use of an expensive
drug, Zaltrap, costing $11,000 in favor of using a more cost-effective cancer drug, Avastin, costing
$5,000).
257. See supra notes 203–207 and accompanying text. See also Montgomery, supra note 195,
at A1, A6 (stating that “[a]n average of 10,000 baby boomers will turn 65 every day for the next
20 years”).
258. Avik Roy, Saving Medicare From Itself, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Summer 2011, at 35, 33–45.
When Medicare was enacted, the average life expectancy was 70.2 years; however, by 2010 the
average life expectancy had increased to 78.4 years. Id. Thus, the average coverage period per
individual has grown 158%. Id. at 45.
259. The Fiscal Consequences of the Health Care Law: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On the
Budget, 112 Cong. 13 (2011) (statement of Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services) [hereinafter Foster Testimony]. The GAO Journal reported flagrant abuse
and overspending by Medicare of hundreds of millions of dollars for reimbursement of hospitals
and clinics for drugs to treat patients using dialysis. Peter Whoriskey, Medicare Eyes Payments for
Dialysis Drugs, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2013, at A12. Sadly, until new rates for reimbursement are
established in 2014, these overpayments will continue. Id.
260. 42 U.S.C § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(iv) (Supp. V 2012).
261. See Foster Testimony, supra note 259, at 5.
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patients that require the same treatment for a total cost of $110 million.
Thus, the projected growth rate is 10%. The Chief Actuary determined
that the target growth rate for Year 3 is 3%. The Board would then be
required to cut $7 million to meet the target growth rate. In order to
meet this rate, the Board must either: (A) reduce the amount of patients
undergoing chemotherapy by denying the procedure to 7,000 patients;
or (B) reduce the price paid to providers from $10,000 to $9,363.64
for each patient that receives treatment.
Choice A amounts to direct rationing, while Choice B will erode the quality
of care provided to Medicare patients and ultimately lead to indirect rationing.
This conclusion is shared by the Obama Administration’s former Administrator
of Medicare and Medicaid, Donald Berwick, who said “[t]he decision is not
whether or not we will ration care—the decision is whether we will ration with
our eyes open.” 262
Based on this paradigm, an argument could be made that a small difference in
payment per procedure between Medicare patients and market cost will not
cause providers to discontinue servicing Medicare patients. Properly viewed,
however, the aggregate impact of these payment cuts is astounding. The Chief
Actuary estimates that between 2010-2019 reduced payment levels will “save”
$233 billion. 263 In reality, this figure represents the amount of money that
providers will lose if they choose Medicare patients over the insured. $233
billion is a compelling economic incentive for providers to leave the Medicare
program — right when enrollment is expected to explode.
The incentive to discontinue service to Medicare patients is compounded by
the influx of patients that will qualify for private insurance under the PPACA.
By 2019, the PPACA will provide private insurance to an additional sixteen
million people. These costs are subsidized by by funds diverted from
Medicare. 264 The discrepancy between Medicare rates and market costs paid by
private insurer rates will grow as Medicare and private insurance enrollment
increases. 265 Once the rate discrepancy reaches a certain point, physicians and
hospitals will cease to provide services to current and future Medicare
patients. 266 Ultimately, Medicare beneficiaries will not enjoy the same degree
of access to health care services. Those providers that do remain under the
Medicare program will be forced to reduce their costs per procedure for
Medicare patients, and thus, Medicare patients will receive a lower quality of
care than patients that receive subsidized private insurance. 267
262. Atlas, supra note 255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. See Foster Testimony, supra note 259, at 12.
264. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, supra note 231, at 4; see also supra note 210 and
accompanying text.
265. See Foster Testimony, supra note 259, at 12; Roy, supra note 258, at 47–48.
266. See Atlas, supra note 255.
267. See Roy, supra note 258, at 36. Likewise, roughly 42 % of U.S. physicians are over the
age of fifty-five. Sandra G. Boodman, Aging Doctors Face Greater Scrutiny, KAISER HEALTH
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B. Dire Projections from the Government and Health Care Providers
Both the federal government and private health care associations recognize
the IPAB’s potential implications for Medicare providers and patients. 268 In his
memorandum on the financial impact of the PPACA, Chief Actuary, Richard S.
Foster, wrote: “[P]roviders for whom Medicare constitutes a substantive portion
of their business could find it difficult to remain profitable and, absent legislative
intervention, might end their participation in the program (possibly jeopardizing
access to care for beneficiaries).” 269 Foster reiterated this concern in his
testimony before the House Committee on the Budget. 270 The Office of the
Actuary at CMS estimates that roughly 15 % of Part A providers will become
unprofitable over the next ten years. 271 Finally, the Medicare Board of Trustees
has also cautioned that “[u]nless providers could reduce their cost per service
correspondingly, through productivity improvements or other steps, they would
eventually become unwilling or unable to treat Medicare beneficiaries.” 272
Health care providers fear that the payment cuts will not only harm current
patients, but also impact the long-term quality of Medicare. 273 The Chair of the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) Board of Trustees, Edward L.
Langston, M.D., wrote that “[t]rying to save Medicare money by slashing
physician payments will ruin the physician foundation of Medicare for current
and future generations of seniors.” 274 The AMA is currently calling for the
repeal of the IPAB because it “puts important health care payment and policy
decisions in the hands of an independent body that has far too little
accountability.” 275 As evidenced by the grave concern within the medical
community, the IPAB’s structure and authority must be reconsidered and its
potential ramifications must be explored further.
Senator John Cornyn sought to repeal the IPAB through legislation that he
introduced in the 112th Congress in 2011, entitled the “Health Care Bureaucrats

NEWS (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/december/11/aging-doctors
-face-greater-scrutiny.aspx. As these doctors begin to retire and new doctors seek to avoid
Medicare patients, access will likely be further restricted. Roy, supra note 258, at 44.
268. See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, supra note 231, at 9–10.
269. Id. at 10.
270. Foster Testimony, supra note 259, at 14.
271. Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, supra note 231, at 10.
272. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 2 (Aug. 5,
2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends
-and-Reports/ReportsTrustFunds/downloads/tr2010.pdf.
273. See Phil Roe, Pound the Medicare Board Before It Hammers the Elderly, WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2013, at B1 (discussing how the PPACA and Medicare cuts will change patient care).
274. Trapp, supra note 206, at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Letter from James L. Madara to The Honorable Joe Pitts, Chairman, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health (Feb. 27, 2012), available at http://www.ama
-assn.org/resources/doc/washington/hr452-support-letter-27feb2012.pdf.
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Elimination Act.” 276 However, the Bill was never reported out of Committee
for a vote. 277
On December 20, 2012, the U.S. District Court in Arizona dismissed the
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendment challenges to the constitutionality of the
PPACA and—particularly—to the IPAB’s unfettered ability to dictate the extent
to which physicians can charge fees for medical care, the manner in which
insurance companies pay for it, and which patients can have access to new
cutting edge technologies. 278 In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Sebelius, 279 the issues raised were found, essentially, to be moot. 280
Nevertheless, an appeal was made to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th
Circuit. 281
VI. CONCLUSION
The effort to re-negotiate the American notion of a social contract to include
universal health care and to structure a template for achieving social justice
through the distribution of health care resources are noble goals. However,
rather than imposing a federal standard that restricts state autonomy in managing
health resources, the better position is to allow the states—through co-operative
federalism—to serve as laboratories to “try novel social and economic
experiments.” 282

276. S. 668, 112th Cong. (2011); see Roe, supra note 272 (detailing the efforts of Congressman
Roe to repeal the PPACA and his specific efforts to introduce legislation to repeal the IPAB through
passage of The Protecting Seniors’ Access to Medicine Act, H.R. 351, which has 160 co-sponsors
and has been referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee). In the last session of
Congress, the House passed identical legislation by a vote of 223-184, but the bill was never
considered by the Senate. Art Kelly, HR 351, To Repeal the Rationing Board in Obamacare, 60
SECOND ACTIVIST (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.60secondactivist.com/content/hr-351-repeal
-rationing-board-obamacare. But see PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD WILL HELP REDUCE HEALTH COSTS:
REPEALING IPAB WOULD BE UNWISE 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-15
-12health.pdf (observing that if the IPAB was repealed, Congress would likely shift more costs to
beneficiaries by increasing Medicare premiums and raising the age of Medicare eligibility).
277. Health Care Bureaucrats Elimination Act (2011; 112th Congress S. 668), GOVTRAC.US,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s668#overview (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
278. See Coons v. Geithner, No. CV-10-1714-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 6674394, at *1, *5 (D.
Ariz. Dec. 20, 2012); supra Part IV.C (discussing the IPAB’s role and impact on patient care).
279. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
280. Coons, 2012 WL 6674393, at *1, *3.
281. Appellants’ Brief at 1, Coons, 2012 WL 6674394, appeal docketed, No. 13-15324 (9th
Cir. Feb. 19, 2013). The fight to strike down portions of the PPACA in the courts is still alive in
courts, and, further, the idea of Congress repealing the PPACA is alive as well. See Christopher
Conover, Op-Ed. Obamacare: Not Too Late to Take Back This Lemon, WASH. EXAMINER, Mar.
29, 2013, at 30 (observing that a congressional repeal of the PPACA is a viable option, because the
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was repealed some sixteen months after its 1988 enactment).
282. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

36

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 63:1

As laboratories for public policy experimentation in governance, the states
should be allowed to undertake their work through mediating structures, thereby
enhancing “the pluralism that mediating structures make possible.” 283 It is key
to define mediating structures as “institutions standing between the individual in
his private life and the large institutions of public life,” 284 and to recognize that
they are the primary agents of social welfare. This allows the mediating
structures to underscore and validate their own inherent responsibility for health
care, 285 and encourages decentralized medical delivery systems, instead of
expanding the bureaucratic powers of a leviathan, which destroys or
compromises state autonomy. 286
When deciding whether a law is legitimate, it is necessary to determine
whether the law reflects the general will of an informed polity and treats all
members equally. The PPACA is not a provision within America’s social
contract, but rather a return to “might makes right” 287 or “command-andcontrol” 288 with the potential for disastrous consequences. Rousseau’s social
contract is not an express mandate for government growth, nor is it a tool for
economic equality. The social contract, as envisioned by Rousseau and adopted
by the United States, is a pact between the people and the government that
guarantees a right to property and civil liberties. It is a foundation that allows
individuals to succeed.
The fears of unfettered regulatory bureaucracies going “rogue” were raised by
Justice Anton Scalia’s dissent in Mistretta v. United States in 1989. 289 There he
opined—and even predicted—that unless the prohibition on delegation of
legislative power was enforced by the judiciary, Congress would be emboldened
to create:
‘expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process, to which
Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking
responsibility. How tempting to create an expert Medical Commission
283. PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO
CIVIL SOCIETY 207 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996). See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 88, at 1124
(observing how states act as “[l]aboratories of [p]artisan [p]olitics”).
284. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 282 at 158.
285. Id. at 162–63. Private sector charities may be included within the notion of mediating
structures—especially because they are more efficient in securing assistance to those in need and
“encouraging self-sufficiency and self-reliance.” JOHN C. GOODMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS, WHY NOT ABOLISH THE WELFARE STATE?, Executive Summary (1994),
available at http:www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st187.pdf.
286. BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 282, at 199–200.
287. G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 283 (1973) (stating that “might makes right” is the
manifestation of a totalitarian government).
288. Grace-Marie Turner, Repeal Obamacare’s Payment Panel Now, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar.
21, 2012, 4:00 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/repeal-obamacares-payment
-panel-now/article/392811.
289. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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(mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) to
dispose of such thorny, ‘no-win’ political issues as the withholding of
life-support systems in federally funded hospitals . . . . The only
government power the Commission possesses is the power to make
law; and it is not the Congress. 290
Justice Scalia’s predictions materialized two decades later—for this is now
the very character of the IPAB.
Justice Scalia’s concerns over the expansion of the vast regulatory network
and agenda of federal regulatory agencies, together with a near total abnegation
of the notion of co-operative federalism through the states acting in partnership
with the federal government, are both valid and—indeed—problematic. Two
sets of facts confirm this present state of affairs. First, from 2001 to 2006,
Congress enacted twenty-seven statutes, which not only pre-empted state health,
safety, and environmental regulations as well as other social policies, but also
effectively prohibited state regulation in its entirety. 291
Second, a recent study by the Competitive Enterprise Institute found that
federal administrative agencies finalized forty-seven more rules and regulations
than laws enacted in 2011. 292 Further, the Institute found that while Congress
legislated eighty-one new laws in 2011, the duly approved administrative
agencies promulgated 3,807 regulations; or, in other words, “47 times more new
rules than laws.” 293 Previously in 2010, Congress enacted 217 new laws—this,
compared with 3,573 rules. 294 This statistical record decisively shows that
regulatory bodies issued sixteen times more rules than Congress enacted laws. 295
The end result of these findings by the Enterprise Institute is that congressional
power and responsibility has been delegated—improperly—to a fourth branch
of government: the regulatory branch. 296
290. Id. at 422.
291. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 3, at 82.
292. Paul Bedard, Out of Control: 47 New Regs for Every New Law, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan.
30, 2013, 9:35 AM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/article/2519994.
293. See id.
294. Id.
295. Id. See Ron Arnold, Watchdogging Obama’s Regulatory State, WASH. EXAMINER, Feb.
5, 2014, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/watchdogging-obamas-regulatory
-state/article/2543540.
296. See Thomas J. Donohue, The Fourth Branch of Government, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb.
11, 2013, at 29 (examining the systemic consequences of over regulation resulting in the passage
of “economically significant” rules costing $100 million or more—with 127 such rules being
passed in 2003 and some 224 rules being promulgated in 2012, and reporting on a GAO study
showing that 35 % of these rules were issued without public comment period). It has been estimated
that American businesses and families will expend approximately 189 million hours annually in
order to comply with Obamacare’s regulatory requirements. Paul Bedard, Obamacare Red Tape
Burden Surges to 189 Million Hours a Year-And It Hasn’t Even Started, WASH. EXAMINER (May.
7, 2013, 4:20 PM), available at http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-care-red-tape-burden
-surges-to-189-million-hours-a-year-and-it-hasn’t-even-started/article/252903. The House Ways
and Means, Education and The Workforce, and the Energy and Commerce Committees have an
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In 1989, Charles Murray stated both a fundamental truth and a caveat in trying
to manage social policy—and in this case, health care—when he acknowledged,
social problems in a democratic society tend to produce net harm in
dealing with the most difficult programs. They will inherently tend to
have enough of an inducement to produce bad behavior and not
enough of a solution to stimulate good behavior; and the more difficult
the problem, the more likely it is that this relationship will prevail.
The lesson is not that we can do no good at all, but that we must pick
our shots. 297
Although there is no objective metric available to determine the adequate level
of care, conceptually, it can be evaluated by patterns of access and overall efforts
to improve equity. Reasonable individuals disagree invariably over what
particular patterns and policies satisfy the standards of adequacy. 298 The level
of health care resources available determines the level of health care
distributed. 299 These resource allocations must reflect, accordingly, the cost and
benefits of such care. 300
As “self-interested choosers,” the behavior of individuals and the direction of
policy is shaped—if not directed—by incentives. 301 Thus, when either benefits
or costs change, incentives must also change, and ideally, these incentives
should be guided by rational choice. 302 The response to changes in incentives
becomes central to determining public policy on any given issue. 303
Inasmuch as the federal government primarily underwrites the health care
program for senior citizens, little incentives exist for seniors to either curb
patterns of consumption or seek better prices. 304 Rather than incentivize
savings, Congress has historically sought to restrict spending by limiting rates
of reimbursement for physician-providers. 305 Because of the political power of
online site to track compliance burdens of implementing the PPACA. ObamaCare Burden Tracker,
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE & COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE,
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/aca_burden_tracker_.pdf (last visted Feb. 18,
2014). See generally George P. Smith, II, An Obscure Object of Desire: Minimizing the
Information Reporting Burden, 31 ADMIN. L. REV. 115 (1979).
297. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980 218
(1984).
298. SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, supra note 1, at 35.
299. Id. at 36.
300. Id. at 36–47.
301. See BECKER & POSNER, supra note 25, at 4, 15 (commenting that economic growth and
changes in economic growth have led families around the world to have fewer and fewer children,
because of investments in female education and employment opportunities); see also Tom G.
Palmer, Poverty, Morality, and Liberty, in AFTER THE WELFARE STATE 109, 123–25 (Tom G.
Palmer ed., 2012) (discussing the proposition that “[i]institutions create incentive and incentives
shape behavior”).
302. See BECKER & POSNER, supra note 25, at 15; Palmer, supra note 300, at 123–25.
303. See BECKER & POSNER, supra note 25, at 15; Palmer, supra note 300, at 123–25.
304. Dalmia, supra note 219.
305. Id.
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provider groups, whenever automatic cuts have been proposed, Congress has
always stopped or delayed the cuts. 306
This time, however, 90 % of the country’s physicians appear to be
“completely uninformed” about the effect of Obamacare on the practice of
medicine. 307 Yet, there is a pervasive fear of a mass exodus among physicians
and a growing resistance among health care providers to the government’s
underpayment for medical costs. 308 Rather than wait for the full impact of
Obamacare, a number of physicians are already taking early retirement, selling
their practices, or converting to fee-for-service, and thereby limiting their
exposure to Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance. 309
It is anticipated that because Medicaid is cheaper, more and more individuals
who qualify will drop their private insurance coverage for the full Medicaid
program. 310 Because reimbursements for Medicaid are lower and more
problematic to realize, providers will simply limit the number of Medicaid
patients they accept. 311 This will ultimately cause the cost of medical care to
rise, while access to Medicaid services will fall. 312
While the federal government and the Obamacare health program are
obviously central players in the present struggle for more effective allocations
of finite health care resources, Americans, themselves, are in large measure to
“blame” for the present state of uncertainty. Quite simply, Americans “lack the
information critical to understanding the need for change;” and, they lack the
will power to cure conspicuous consumption. 313
Any solution—if, indeed, there is a single solution or policy to curtailing or
even breaking a culture of dependency and a widening network of social
306. Id.
307. Valerie Richardson, Vital Signs, The Realities of Obamacare: Doctors Feel Ill Winds,
Blowing as They Look Closely at ‘Obamacare,’ WASH. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2013, at A1.
308. Id. There is also a discussion as to whether physicians will soon become obsolete—this,
as a consequence of new robotic medical technologies born from IBM’s super computer, “Watson,”
being tested and utilized presently in the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City.
Jonathan Cohn, The Robot Will See You Now, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 3, 2012, at 59.
309. Richardson, supra note 307.
310. Id.; see Brian Hughes, President Obama’s Health Care Plan Faces Doubt Among the
Young and the Restless, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 19, 2013, 6:45 PM), available at
http://washingtonexaminer.com/president-obamas-health-care-plan-faces-doubts-among-the
-young-and-the-restless/article/2521863 (predicting that the perceived inequity between senior
citizens receiving lower health insurance premiums under Obamacare than younger, healthier
members of society, who will be required to assume a greater share of health care delivery costs in
order to compensate for the discount of older retirees, will be fatal to a sustained level of success
for PPACA); see also supra notes 24–29, 167–169, and accompanying text (discussing issues of
social and intergenerational justice).
311. See Richardson, supra note 307.
312. Id. .
313. Lawrence, supra note 141. See generally MICHAEL F. CANNON, 50 VETOES: HOW
STATES CAN STOP THE OBAMA HEALTH CARE LAW (2013), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/50-vetoes-white-paper_1.pdf.
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benefits—is to balance federal responsibility with the need for both state
autonomy and individual responsibility. If co-operative federalism is to be
effective in health care, it must be viewed economically as “a scheme of
decentralized governance, designed to optimize the provision of government
services.” 314 There are finite limits—both economic and social—to government
action. Accordingly, for every fundamental right asserted, there is a co-ordinate
responsibility that the asserted right be exercised reasonably, effectively, and
within the boundaries of cost–benefit analysis. 315
The search for social balance in an affluent society is but a search for “the
satisfaction of private and public needs;” 316 and, the search for this balance is
“lost [invariably] in the debate over equality and social equity.” 317 Fairness is
not strictly pertinent to economic analysis—because, economic analysis seeks
to “determin[e] which allocation of scarce resources maximizes wealth” and is
efficient. 318
In testing the limits of reasonable conduct, establishing a point of balance in
lawmaking, and formulating administrative policy, the Restatement of Torts
presents not only a template or framework for principled decision making at the
macro level (e.g., congressional), it also should be utilized at the micro level by
regulatory agencies—for individual policy making functions. 319 Put simply,
regulatory decisions and policies should be guided by a cost–benefit analysis
that seeks to measure the effectiveness of a decision by comparing the social
benefits of proposed rules or policies with their economic costs. 320
The Medicare program that so many in the nation rely upon is currently
traveling along a course destined for disaster. Rather than intervening, Congress
chose to tie itself to the mast and relinquish its responsibility to an appointed
board with inscrutable authority. Determining how to control Medicare costs
should properly be left to elected officials that can be held accountable by the
very populace their decisions affect.

314. BECKER & POSNER, supra note 25, at 220; see CARING AND THE LAW, supra note 253, at
88. See generally Yuval Levin & Ramesh Ponnuru, Repeal, Replace, Still, NAT’L. REV. (Mar. 20,
2013, 12:00 AM), available at https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/343540 (arguing that
Obamacare’s primary flaw is that it ignores fundamental economics and attempts to force
consumers to purchase a product that they would not ordinarily buy).
315. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW chs. 1–2 (8th ed.
2011) (discussing the nature of economic reasoning, the economic approach to the law, and the
impact on social theory).
316. GALBRAITH, supra note 34, at 320.
317. Id. at 264.
318. DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
NUISANCE LAW 17 (1992).
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827–28 (1979).
320. See id.
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The allocation of limited resources should be dictated by the informed and
compassionate relationship between the patient and physician. 321 The choices
that flow from this relationship, based on mutual trust, must be free from any
coercive influence. 322 At its best, the IPAB will poison this hallowed
relationship between patients and physicians. At its worst, the IPAB will enact
irreversible legislation that will reduce the quality and access to health care
under Medicare, jeopardize the lives of this Nation’s greatest generation, and
mortally wound the American health care system

321. See Smith, supra note 24, at 4–5; see also Pellegrino, supra note 21, at 23. See generally
SMITH, supra note 22, at 18 (commenting, among other things, that delivering medical care in a
“marketplace” should emphasize both typical incentives–”entrepreneurship, efficiency and profit
maximization”–as well as–”customer satisfaction and ability to pay”).
322. See Clayton Christensen et al., The Coming Failure of ‘Accountable Care’, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 19, 2013, at A15 (suggesting a central flaw in the PPACA is a fatal assumption that physicians
will adopt new, transformative behavioral approaches to the practice of medicine, which will not
only reduce the actual expenses of medical services—by utilizing evidence-based protocols in order
to assess optimal treatments—but, as cost conscious gatekeepers, adapt some facets of care “to
lower-cost sites of service,” e.g., ambulatory clinics rather than hospitals); see also Scott Gottlieb,
The Doctor Won’t See You Now. He’s Clocked Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2013, at A13 (observing
that because of Obamacare, the practice of medicine will become so expensive that physicians are
expected to close their private offices to become salaried hospital employees). See generally
Thomas A. Firey, Is IPAB A Paper Tiger?, REGULATION, Winter 2013–2014, at 46 (predicting that,
as a result of political pressure from the President and Congress, IPAB will be largely ineffective
and will lead to waste).

